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Green Luxury Goods? The Economics of Eco-Labels in the Japanese 
Housing Market 
 
Abstract 
Using a unique transaction database of  condominiums in the Tokyo metropolitan area and a 
hedonic analytical framework, we find that eco-labelled buildings command a small but 
significant premium on both the asking and transaction prices. This finding is consistent with 
results from other countries but in contrast to these studies, the present analysis also 
incorporates buyer characteristics which provide further information on the sources of 
demand for eco-labelled real estate. A separate estimation by subgroups reveals that the 
price premium is primarily driven by wealthier households that exhibit a higher willingness-
to-pay for eco-labelled condominiums, both as a total amount and as a fraction of the total 
sales price. Less affluent households are also shown to pay higher prices for the eco label but 
the effect is less pronounced. The results indicate that capitalised utility bill savings are likely 
to account for a large proportion of the observed premium but the higher premium paid by 
affluent households suggests that more intangible benefits of living in a green building may 
also play a role.  
 
Research into the profitability of environmentally friendly buildings has reached a critical 
juncture. The seminal studies (Miller, Spivey, Florance, 2008, Fuerst and McAllister, 2011, 
Reichardt, Fuerst and Zietz, 2012, Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley, 2010, 2011 and Eichholtz 
and Quigley 2012 to name just a few) provided first valuable insights into the pricing of 
sustainable real estate. However, these studies are also characterised by important 
limitations. Firstly, they typically focus on specific property markets in specific countries and 
over specific time frames which means that their results may not be readily generalisable to 
other sectors, places and time periods. This is particularly relevant as the majority of studies 
were conducted using data from the US office market, possibly because of data availability. 
Secondly, these studies rely on a relatively small number of data sources (notably from the 
CoStar Group) which provide a great wealth of information on property characteristics but 
are rather limited regarding the environmental performance and general sustainability 
indicators.  
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The residential sector has attracted a much smaller number of academic studies in this topic 
area, despite its large size and obvious relevance for both the general economy and 
sustainable development. The reasons for this lack of empirical evidence are not clear. 
Larger fragmentation of investors and a lower fraction of professional or institutional 
investment in the market driving the discourse around 'green value' of real estate 
investments may be a contributing factor. Also, housing markets are highly regulated and 
prone to inefficiencies in many countries which makes it more difficult to measure the 
contribution of sustainability and energy efficiency to prices and rents. Despite the widely 
accepted proposition that monetary incentives are more effective in reducing environmental 
harm than ‘command and control’ policies, (Requate and Unold (2003)), the housing market 
seems to be lagging behind other sectors in offering an attractive business case for 
investments in sustainability and energy efficiency. 'Green' financial instruments are still not 
used widely in the residential sector which makes capitalisation into the lump-sum house 
price the only channel for economic rewards of sustainability. As this poses a significant risk 
for any upfront investment in energy efficiency, 'green value' might not be readily observable 
in housing markets According to Kotchen (2006), green markets can principally be 
understood as a form of a private provision of a public good and as such can have either 
beneficial or detrimental aggregate effects depending on technology, individual wealth levels 
and the initial level of the public good. This proposition has been evaluated empirically, for 
example by Jacobsen et al (2012).in the context of residential electricity demand. However, 
it may be argued that the privatised public good is a at best a secondary consideration of 
green consumers whose decision may be guided by purely private cost savings in the form 
of lower utility bills and, equally private, green signalling benefits to their social peers, 
costumers etc. It seems likely that any observed green premium primarily reflects these 
private benefits.  
 
Despite these apparent obstacles, the existing evidence on housing markets points to a 
significant green premium. An early study by Dian and Miranowski (1989) showed that 
investments in energy efficiency increase house prices. Banfi et al. (2005) published 
research findings indicating that residential tenants are prepared to pay up to 13% higher 
rent for buildings that have adopted energy-saving measures. Similarly, Fuerst et al (2015) 
found a price effect of higher energy performance in the British housing market for a large 
sample of sales transactions in the 1995-2011 time period, indicating a 14% premium of the 
highest band of the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) over the lowest band. They also 
find that this effect tends to be larger for terraced dwellings and flats compared to detached 
and semi-detached houses. Earlier, Brounen and Kok (2011) had examined the relationship 
between EPC ratings and sale price for 31,993 residential sale prices in 2008-9 in the 
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Netherlands and report significant premiums for more energy-efficient buildings. Although 
their dataset contains a large number of control variables, the adoption rate of EPCs in the 
Dutch housing market was relatively low at the time (7-25% depending on the year) which 
may limit their findings. Similarly, Zheng and Kahn (2008) and Zheng, Kahn and Deng 
(2012) find significant price premia for 'green' properties in the Chinese housing market and 
a study by Deng, Li and Quigley (2012) finds substantial economic returns to green buildings 
in Singapore. Kok and Kahn (2014) as well as Hyland et al (2013) arrive at similar 
conclusions for the Californian and the Irish housing market respectively.  
 
This paper examines the 'green value' proposition in the context of the Japanese housing 
market. Using a unique transaction database of contains roughly 25,000 housing 
transactions in the Tokyo condominium market, we seek to establish whether an eco-label 
carries a significant premium in asking and/or transaction prices.  
 
There are a number of existing studies on the Japanese market for green buildings, for 
example Shimizu (2010) who have conducted an analysis focusing on the new condominium 
market using asking prices and transaction prices. However, due to the small size of their 
sales transactions sample, the results did not reach a satisfying level of statistical reliability. 
A larger study was conducted by Yoshida and Sugiura (2015). Using a sample of roughly 
35,000 condominiums the authors find that eco-labelled condominiums were sold at a 
discount, rather than a premium and offer a number of empirical and methodological 
explanations for this result. A possible reason is that Japan is already characterised by a 
high level of energy efficiency in the building and appliances sector as well as the larger 
economy which may be why a green label carries less currency compared to a market with 
lower average levels of energy efficiency where considerable savings can be expected from 
a green product. Interestingly, however, they do find a premium for long-life design, 
suggesting a willingness to pay for superior durability and slower depreciation of a building 
or condominium. 1      
 
The present study seeks to clarify the conflicting findings regarding the Tokyo market and 
contributes to the body of evidence by applying the largest and most comprehensive dataset 
to date in this investigation of 'green value' in the Japanese context. Crucially, it contains 
information on the property development company as a proxy for quality as well as buyer 
characteristics which were possible omitted variables in the earlier studies cited above.  
 
                                               
1This interpretation of the private provision of public goods hypothesis in the light of the current study of the 
Tokyo green housing label was provided by an anonymous reviewer of this paper whom we thank. 
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Data 
The principal source for the sales transactions database applied in this case study is the 
Tokyo Association of Real Estate Appraisers (2010) which collects transaction prices for new 
condominiums and used condominiums. Green labels are currently only awarded in the 
Tokyo market  for new builds and not for used condominiums. While our use of new builds 
only may limit the application of our findings to the general housing market, it avoids the 
reported problems arising from any discontinuities that may exist in how property 
characteristics are priced in the new-build and re-sale markets.   
   
The dataset was collected using a survey of house price and attribute information. The most 
important piece of information concerns prices per unit, both the asking price (which is the 
producer's offer price) and the recorded transaction price. Further, in order to ensure 
consistency with hedonic theory, data relating to buyer characteristics such as income, 
household size, etc., was gathered. The questionnaire survey was conducted by the Recruit 
Housing Institute, starting in November 2011. Surveys were conducted in writing, via 
submissions from a large number of home buyers. Contract data were also used to collect 
accurate transaction prices. In addition, information on freehold/leasehold and the form of 
management were recorded by the questionnaire survey, i.e. is the building managed 
through visits (called ‘patrols’), through day shifts (a manager works in the administrative 
office during the day time only), or by having a permanent presence on site (a manager 
works in the administrative office and is present on a 24-hour basis). The intuition behind 
gathering this information was that the quality and availability of management services is 
said to be reflected in condominium prices. More importantly, it can also be viewed as a 
proxy for other unobservable quality characteristics that might otherwise be captured by the 
green label which, in the worst case, could lead to omitted variable bias and overstated 
green premiums. Standard hedonic characteristics such as the total number of condominium 
units, lot area, and overall building area were also included. Moreover, we assume that price 
differentials may also arise based on the developer's and (main) construction company's 
reputation and brand power..2 
 
Market conditions and dynamics are an important control variable in any hedonic analysis. 
Therefore, we included the first-month contract rate as a proxy. The first-month contract rate 
reflects the percentage of units sold within the first month of marketing a particular property. . 
                                               
2A dummy variable was created to distinguish: leading construction companies (1) Takenaka Corporation, (2) 
Obayashi Corporation, (2) Kajima Corporation, (4) Shimizu Corporation, and (5) Taisei Corporation; second-tier 
construction companies (6) Kumagai Gumi, (7) Toda Corporation, (8) Penta-Ocean Construction, (9) Konoike 
Construction, (10) Sato Kogyo, (11) Mitsui Construction, (12) Mitsubishi Construction, (13) Sumitomo 
Construction, (14) Nishimatsu Construction, and (15) Haseko Corporation; and (16) other. 
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It is thought that a higher first-month contract rate reflects better general market conditions 
but a higher relative rate (i.e. relative to the market average at the time) also indicates how 
affordable the housing unit prices are in relation to the condominium's features.  
 
In addition to the Recruit Housing Institute's survey data, the Japanese Real Estate 
Economic Institute's database was used. Along with  the developer's asking price, the 
following key variables were drawn from the Real Estate Economic Institute's database: 
name of the  development company, development overview (development scale), location 
characteristics (geo-coordinates, address, nearest station, distance to nearest station), and 
building characteristics (building area, land area, building structure). This information was 
matched  to the data gathered by the Recruit Housing Institute. Appendix 1 contains a 
complete overview of the variables used in the analysis. Using these sources, a large 
database was assembled for the 10-year period from 2001 to 2011 but the 2001-2003 period 
is disregarded in our analysis as no transactions of eco-labelled buildings were recorded 
during that time. 
 
We identify green buildings as those that are labelled under the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government's Green Labelling System for Condominiums. This scheme is based on the 
Green Building Program which was introduced in June 2002 and mandates that all large-
scale construction or major refurbishment projects exceeding 10,000m2 submit an 
environmental plan at the time of planning as well as a completion notice. Additionally, in 
October 2005, the Green Labelling System for Condominiums was started which required 
the gathering and publishing of information based on four environmental evaluation items. 
The four evaluation items are: a) quality of building insulation which addresses reduction in 
the building's heat load; b) facility energy-saving performance, which addresses energy-
saving systems; and c) lifespan extension and d) greening of the building, which address 
lifespan extension, etc., and greening. The evaluation results for the respective items are 
expressed as a number of star symbols ranging from one to three stars. In addition, in order 
to increase recognition among consumers, condominium buildings under the obligation to 
submit an environmental plan document had to indicate the scores of the evaluation items. 
Moreover, from January 2010 onward, the system was changed to cover not only owner-
occupied condominium buildings but also rental condominium buildings and the floor space 
for which notification is required was lowered to 5,000 m2 in total. This change also 
stipulated that owners of smaller buildings were also permitted to apply for this label at their 
own discretion. 
 
The hedonic model used for this analysis includes a dummy variable for buildings with two or 
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more stars for either a) building insulation (covering reduction in the building's heat load) or 
facility energy-saving performance (covering energy-saving systems) and 0 otherwise. The 
dummy variable is not applied to buildings which have only one star under the Green 
Labelling System for Condominiums as this was deemed too low to qualify as a credible 
'green' product.  Moreover, with regard to building performance evaluation, the existence of 
a Housing Design Performance Evaluation Document and Housing Construction 
Performance Evaluation Document based on the Housing Quality Assurance Act is also 
considered in our analysis. This is done to ensure that the measured price contribution of a 
green label is separated from the effect of conventional Housing Performance Evaluation 
and quality assurance documents. 
 
Adequate location controls are essential in any attempt to disentangle the factors 
contributing to property prices. In the present analysis we use a fine-grained 500m x 500m 
mesh block in which the condominium is located as a unit. Specifically, the characteristics 
are built-up area, average floor space, standard deviation of floor space,  number of floors 
for each building and the standard deviation for the number of floors. Next, area-based 
information on the proportion of the population aged 65 and over and the proportion of office 
workers in the pertaining census mesh block were added. To account for unobserved spatial 
characteristics, we also generate a local administrative district dummy. A further set of 
dummy variables indicates proximity to a railway line and the time required to Tokyo Station 
from the nearest station was also included as a regressor. 
 
Buyer characteristics are an important feature of our analysis as outlined above. The 
following variables were considered: home buyers' annual income, age, occupation, 
household size, number of children and identifier for first time buyers. With regard to 
occupation , differences by employment status,3 work category,4 and industry category5 were 
examined. 
 
                                               
3
Regarding employment status, the survey uses the following classification: 01. permanent employee, 02. 
contract employee, 03. civil servant/public organisation employee, 04. self-employed, 05. physician/lawyer/tax 
accountant/accountant/etc., 06. part-time/casual, 07. homemaker, 08. student, and 09. unemployed. There 
were no samples corresponding to contract worker, part-time worker, homemaker, or student. 
4
The survey was conducted using the following classification for employment category: 01. clerical job, 02. 
sales job, 03. technical job, 04. service/retail job, 05. construction/manufacturing job, 06. specialized job, 07. 
management job, and 08. company executive. 
5
The following items were surveyed as industry categories: 01. agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 02. 
construction, 03. manufacturing, 04. transportation/warehousing, 05. finance/securities/insurance, 06. 
advertising/publishing/broadcasting, 07. printing/typesetting, 08. fashion-related, 09. travel/hotel/leisure, 10. 
restaurant/bar, 11. housing/real estate, 12. trading/wholesaling, 13. retail, 14. software/information services, 
15. beauty, 16. medical/welfare, 17. education, 18. creative professions, and 19. other. 
7 
 
In a preliminary step, the distributions and descriptive statistics of the underlying dataset are 
investigated (Table 1). The average asking price of a condominium in Tokyo in the 2005-11 
period was  45.49 million yen while the average value for the transaction price was 
approximately 1.5 million yen lower, at 43.91 million. Large variations in size are oberved, 
from 10m2  studio condominiums to large-scale condominiums exceeding 200m 2. The 
walking time to the nearest public transit station is 7 minutes on average, while the average 
time to Tokyo Central Station is 23 minutes which shows that the properties in our sample 
are generally well served by public transportation and are hence comparable with regard to 
location value. Looking at buyer characteristics, the average age of buyers was 37 and the 
average number of people in the household was 2.3, demonstrating that these buyers are 
typical Japanese households and could hence be considered as representative of Japanese 
home buyers in general. However, an important caveat is that the household head's average 
income was 8.51 million, a level that is about twice the Japanese average income. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the estimation sample 
 
  average 
standard 
deviation 
minimum maximum 
          
asking price (¥ 10,000) 4,589.10  1,470.73  1,190.00  20,600.00 
 transaction price (¥ 10,000) 4,425.59  1,395.83  276.00  18,567.00  
  floor space (sq.m.) 70.40  14.60  20.37  201.34  
  time to nearest station (min)  7.57  4.21  1.00  36.00  
  time to Tokyo Central (min) 23.03  10.71  0.00  175.00  
Age of household head (yr) 37.39  8.81  20.00  90.00  
Household size (persons) 2.36  1.05  1.00  20.00  
Household income (¥10,000) 857.11  426.53  0.00  3,000.00  
 Total units of project 222.90  346.17  9.00  2,801.00  
 Site area (sq.m.) 5,607.56  7,577.62  138.55  48,303.23  
 Total building area (sq.m.) 22,741.43  45,568.15  229.97  383,340.30  
     Number of observations=23,920  
 
 
Model specification 
 
Following the overall research strategy outlined in the previous section and taking into 
account buyer characteristics which are limiting conditions for the bid price function, we 
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specify the following model:  
 
),,,( ),(),(),,( jikjiitji HHNEXGfP   
 
),,( tjiP     : New condominium price of condominium i and dwelling j at time     t (1: asking 
price, 2: transaction price) 
 iG       : Green label of condominium i 
 ),( jiX     : Building characteristics of condominium i & dwelling j 
 kNE     : Location characteristics of region k 
 ),( jiHH   : Buyer characteristics of condominium i and dwelling j 
 
This specification has a number of desirable properties as compared to previously estimated 
hedonic functions. Firstly, regarding the definition of price ( ),,( tjiP  ), both the asking and the 
recorded transaction prices are known in each individual case, allowing us to investigate 
whether sellers have unrealistically high expectations of the market value of a 'green label'.  
 
Secondly, a price differential is generated ( ),( jiX  ) based on differences in condominium (i) 
features such as building structure and the size of the lot area, as well as features related to 
the dwelling (j), such as the floor space, the unit's position (whether or not it is a corner unit), 
etc. In terms of the condominium building's features (i), it has increasingly been pointed out 
that a price differential is generated by the condominium developer or the developer's brand 
(the developer's reliability and quality assurance, which is difficult to observe visually) and by 
the construction company. Therefore, developer and construction company information was 
also gathered and incorporated into our analysis. 
 
Further to these kinds of building and dwelling characteristics, the characteristics of the 
surrounding environment, such as the streetscape of the area (k), the commercial density, 
etc., have a major effect on house prices, proxied by a neighbourhood effect ( kNE  ) in our 
estimation. Accessibility to jobs, schools, shopping and other routine destinations are 
captured by variables measuring the distance to the nearest station, travel time to central 
business district, etc. 
 
Moreover, hedonic pricing theory predicts that the addition of buyer characteristics will yield 
different bid curves reflecting different utility functions and budget constraints. For example, 
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the marginal utility of an extra unit of space will be higher for larger households, all else 
equal. Model 3 relaxes the assumption of a homogenous utility function of all buyers by 
controlling for a series of buyer characteristics in line with suggestions made in the extant 
literature (see Shimizu, Nishimura, and Karato, 2007). 
 
Based on these considerations, the hedonic price function is estimated focusing on the 
condominium price ( ),,( tjiP  ) at time t. First, as a standard model, the following model is 
taken as a starting point (Model 1). 
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where ),( jiT   is a transaction dummy (1 in the case of the transaction price; 0 in the case of 
the asking price), while  tD   (t = 2004 to 2011) is a time dummy. The green label effect is 
captured by a binary variable ( iG  ). The difference between green asking and transaction 
prices can then be derived from a cross-term ( ji TG   ). Next, it was expanded into a 
hedonic function factoring in buyer characteristics, which in theoretical terms should normally 
be considered, but which were difficult to incorporate into the model due to data limitations 
(Model 2).   
 
Moreover, how the green label effect ( iG  ) changed in accordance with the passage of time 
was analyzed (Model 3). 
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Regarding appropriate estimation techniques, our baseline model is an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model in line with the Gauss-Markov Theorem which states that OLS will 
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yield the best linear unbiased estimator provided that the usual assumptions are met. 
Efficiency as well as ease of computation and interpretation make OLS the method of choice 
for the majority of hedonic pricing studies. However, since OLS is known to be sensitive to 
outliers, we also use robust regression as an alternative estimation technique to see whether 
this changes the results for the variables of interest. In particular, Cook's distance measures 
are used to identify bad leverage outliers and Huber and Tukey biweights are applied to 
offset the distorting influence of these outliers on the regression parameters as suggested by 
Huber, 1964; Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987 and Verardi and Croux, 2009. Using OLS and 
robust regression in tandem should provide us with a stable estimate of any pricing 
differentials related to the Tokyo Green Label.   
 
 
Estimation Results and Discussion 
 
The estimation results for the three models are outlined in Table 2 (full estimation results in 
Appendix 2).  The baseline estimation (Model 1) reveals that the average asking price for a 
condominium with a green label is roughly 5% higher compared to a similar condominium 
without a label. In other words, the developers of condominiums with superior environmental 
performance offered them at a marginally but significantly higher price. However, the actual 
achieved transaction prices are more relevant to our main research hypothesis about the 
existence of a green premium in the Tokyo housing market. The general transaction price 
variable indicates that transaction prices were on average approximately 4% lower than 
asking prices in the observed period 2004-2011. When we test specifically how transaction 
prices of green labelled buildings differ from their average asking prices, the coefficients are 
not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This finding suggests that the value of the 
green label was not significantly overestimated by sellers relative to the implicit valuation of 
the buyers. A more detailed list of coefficient estimates is contained in Appendix 2 which 
reveals a number of additional insights into the pricing of green and non-green 
condominiums. Both the Housing Design Performance Evaluation Document (Part A)6 and 
the Housing Performance Construction Evaluation Document (Part B) attract marginal but 
significant price premiums. These evaluation document variables are important for isolating 
the 'pure' effect of the green label effect from other types of quality evaluation of newly built 
properties. Next, similarly distinguishing buildings based on management costs, 
                                               
6
The Housing Performance Indication System is based on the Housing Quality Assurance Act enacted on April 1, 
2000. It evaluates housing performance based on fixed standards, such as complying with the obligatory 10-
year defects liability period for basic structural areas of new housing. Under this system, Housing Performance 
Evaluation Documents are issued, which are divided into Housing Design Performance Evaluation Documents 
and Housing Construction Performance Evaluation Documents. 
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maintenance/renovation investments, etc., shows that such costs and transaction prices are 
positive related. Furthermore, the price was lower when the type of land ownership was 
'general leasehold' or considerably lower for 'fixed-term leasehold'. The price was 2% higher 
when the dwelling is a corner unit. The coefficients of all other control variables including the 
time-period dummy variables exhibited the expected signs.  
 
Model 2 in Table 2 reports the estimation results using robust regression, an estimation 
technique which gives proportionally less weight to influential outliers as described in the 
previous section, thereby reducing the potential bias that a small group of properties with 
extreme or unusual prices and other attributes may introduce to the results. However, the 
results are only slightly different to the baseline model with a 4.3% asking price premium and 
a negligible and insignificant transaction price premium for green-labelled properties.  
 
Next, we examine the impact of buyer characteristics on the model (Models 3-7 of Table 2). 
To this aim, we divide buyers' incomes into four groups and estimate the impact of all price 
determinants separately for each income group7. As expected, green asking price premia 
(as a fraction of the total price) are found to progress with increasing incomes of buyers 
(from 4% to nearly 8%). Similarly,we find that the average price premium observed in 
recorded transaction prices (as opposed to asking prices) is mainly driven by households 
with above-average incomes.paid for green-labelled properties. Given that these are 
percentages on the total price, a base which is higher for more affluent buyers buying more 
expensive properties, the spread in terms of absolute monetary values of these price premia 
is even more pronounced. This finding is significant in that it demonstrates for the first time 
that 'green' features are more likely to attract higher-income buyers despite arguments to the 
contrary that claim energy efficiency and the resulting lower utility bills are a larger concern 
for more income-constrained households.  
 
Further findings relating to buyer characteristics are that first-time buyers exhibit generally a 
lower willingness or ability to pay, particularly in the lower income segments (Appendix 2). 
This may be taken as an indication of first-time buyers acting more cautiously on the housing 
market regardless of current income, possibly because of their relatively lower asset 
possessions compared to buyers who already own a property and seek to 'trade up'.  A price 
differential also occurs based on occupation. Independent of current income and age, it is 
possible that this variable acts as a proxy for future income or the certainty of that income. 
                                               
7
Income groups are defined on a per capita basis of household members as follows: lower income: up to 
￥2.5million p.a. (n=6,038), medium low income:￥2.51 -4.00 million (n=6,982), medium high income:￥4.01 -
5.50 million (n=6,012), high income:￥5.50 million (n=4,568) 
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The fact that annual income and employment generate differences in house prices supports 
our earlier proposition that prices of both green and non-green properties cannot solely 
explained by property characteristics but are also a function of socio-economic buyer 
characteristics.   
 
An important caveat to these findings is that the coefficient estimates of the green asking 
and transaction price premiums as reported here may overestimate the 'true' magnitude of 
the premium for several reasons. Firstly, the green label may be correlated with unobserved 
quality characteristics of the condominiums which may then get lumped into the green 
premium estimate. While we cannot rule out completely that such an estimation problem 
exists, reassurance is provided by the large numbers of hedonic building, spatial and socio-
economic characteristics used in the estimation which go far beyond the standard set of 
variables used in the hedonic estimation. The high goodness of fit of the models around 80% 
of explained variance is testimony to the quality of the dataset.   
 
A second concern is that the positive relationship between household income and observed 
green price premiums may simply reflect better access to capital for more affluent 
households. In other words, it is possible that the underlying willingness to pay is 
independent of income and wealth but only high-income households have access to the 
additional debt or equity capital required to buy a green-labelled condominium. This point is 
important as it may undermine the concept of the green label as an upmarket luxury good. 
More specifically, if the premium were merely a capitalisation of the discounted future utility 
cost reduction and possibly favourable government treatment of green-labelled condominium 
schemes, the different premia obtained for the household income groups may simply show  
the progression of incomplete capitalisation for low incomes to complete capitalisation of 
these cost savings for high incomes. To test this concern empirically we would require data 
on actual energy consumption along with a vector of control variables to measure the true 
cost savings associated with Tokyo Green Label condominiums in operation. In the absence 
of such data, we can only provide rough estimates derived from the existing literature.  Adan 
and Fuerst (2016) report a reduction of 3 to 13 % in energy consumption of housing in the 
UK following a range of heating system and insulation related green retrofit measures. An 
earlier study by Hong et al (2006) reports a reduction in heating demand by 10% in centrally 
heated and 17% in non-centrally heated properties. Considering that utility costs are only a 
relatively small fraction of the capital value of a house or condominium, it thus seems likely 
that the average premium of approximately 5% on average for the Tokyo market reflects 
more than mere utility cost savings. An example using statistics on average energy 
consumption levels can illustrate this point. According to the Family Income and Expenditure 
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Survey compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, the 
average household gas bill (Tokyo Gas) amounts to￥4,972 and the electricity bill to ￥9,472. 
Assuming that households consume 20% less gas and electricity in green-labelled buildings, 
the equivalent figures for households in these buildings would be ￥7,577 and electricity to 
￥3,977. The nominal undiscounted combined savings would then amount to ￥866,640 
(USD 7,100) over a 25 year period. Given an average transaction price of ￥44.25 million 
per condominium in our database, this would amount to only 2 percent of the property value 
and is hence considerably lower than the estimated total premium of approximately 5 
percent. Conversely, households would have to achieve reductions in their energy 
consumption by more than 50% compared to households in the non-green building peer 
group to justify the measured green price premium. If the nominal undiscounted savings in 
our approximation were to be calculated to the net present value, the required energy 
savings of the green label would need to be even higher. It hence seems likely that the 
green premium reflects more than just the pure capitalisation of cost savings.  
 
 
Table 2: Hedonic regression results (dependent variable: log price) 
 
 (1)  
Baseline OLS 
(2)  
Robust reg 
(3)  
OLS with HH 
char 
(4)  
OLS: Income  
low 
(5)  
OLS: Income 
medium low 
(6)  
OLS: Income 
medium high 
(7) 
OLS: Income 
 high 
        
Green asking 
price premium
1
 
0.0482*** 0.0428*** 0.0475*** 0.0368*** 0.0389*** 0.0511*** 0.0589*** 
 (14.43) (13.00) (14.38) (6.00) (6.82) (7.82) (7.13) 
        
Green 
transaction 
price discount
2
 
-0.00552 -0.00592 -0.00552 -0.00111 -0.000849 -0.00888 -0.0132 
 (-1.44) (-1.58) (-1.46) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-1.21) (-1.36) 
        
Transaction 
price discount
 
-0.0383*** -0.0351*** -0.0383*** -0.0435*** -0.0417*** -0.0336*** -0.0330*** 
 (-19.93) (-20.20) (-20.13) (-12.88) (-12.09) (-9.66) (-7.31) 
        
Property & condo 
attributes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Developer fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buyer 
characteristics 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 23,922 23,922 23,922 6,038 6,982 6,012 4,568 
R
2
 0.810 0.829 0.814 0.793 0.803 0.846 0.855 
adj. R
2
 0.809 0.828 0.813 0.788 0.799 0.842 0.850 
AIC -29921.2 . -30403.8 -8982.8 -9474.5 -8421.7 -5171.7 
BIC -28765.4 . -29159.1 -8003.8 -8460.5 -7443.3 -4246.3 
    t statistics in parentheses 
     *
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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1
: Green asking price premium on equivalent unlabelled condominiums. 
2: The dummy variable 'transaction price discount' indicates the average discount observed relative to the equivalent asking price. The 
dummy variable 'green transaction price discount' indicates the additional  discount applied to the transaction of a green-labelled 
condominium. Both the general transaction price discount and the green transaction price discount have to be subtracted from the green 
asking price premium to arrive at the green transaction price premium. For example, in Model 1 the total green premium paid in 
transactions is 1.6%  (6% - 3.5% - 0.9%). 
 
 
Next, we examine how the green price premium for Tokyo condominiums has changed over 
time for different income groups using the baseline hedonic model with the full set of control 
variables (including buyer characteristics) as described above. Following  the introduction of 
the Tokyo green labelling system, the first year with a sufficiently large number of 
transactions was 2005. Figure 1 shows how green labelled and non-labelled condominiums 
developed relative to the 2004 average. For simplicity, only two income groups (above and 
below median) are considered here. After controlling for a large number of variables, the 
estimation results indicate green labelled condominiums bought by more affluent buyers 
commanded the highest premiums over the entire study period. Perhaps even more 
interestingly. the premium paid by below-average green buyers is by and large higher than 
the premium observed for above-average non-green buyers and substantially higher than for 
non-green transactions in the below average income peer group. The green premiums have 
generally declined in the more recent years of the analysis from 2007/8 onwards but the 
price differentiation between the green and the non-green products is still very clear. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the development of the green premium is not merely 
a reflection of the demand and supply balance of labelled properties but was probably also 
influenced by the implementation of environmental policies by the Japanese government, 
typically taking the form of subsidies and favourable tax treatments of green investments.   
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Figure 1: Estimation results of condominium prices relative to 2004 levels in % (0.25=25%) by income 
group and labelling status of the purchased unit. Lower incomes <¥7.5 million, higher incomes 
≥¥7.5 million, R-sq=0.80, N=23,922 
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper set out to test whether obtaining a green label adds value to residential properties 
in the Japanese housing market using a unique dataset of new condominium transactions in 
the Tokyo market. Based on our analysis, this question can be answered in much the same 
way as previous research has done across the world.  
 
The hedonic analysis shows a clear price premium for green-labelled condominiums both for 
asking and transaction prices. Taking into account buyer characteristics, we find that 
wealthier buyers are willing to pay a higher premium for green-labelled properties, both in 
absolute and in relative terms. It appears that eco-labelled condominiums in Tokyo are 
acquired primarily by higher income households who are prepared to pay a premium  for 
owning and occupying a green-labelled property. Conversely, the lower price premiums 
found for below-median income groups may be reflective of the tighter budget constraints 
they face and they may discount possible future cash savings via lower utility bills more 
heavily due to these constraints on their ability to acquire additional up-front capital for 
buying the bundle of goods proxied by the Tokyo green label.   
 
In addition, if one looks at temporal changes in the premium, we find that the effect of green 
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labels became larger over time before declining again in the final two years of the study 
period. In terms of the possible reasons for this, it may be that the awareness of green 
buildings increased in the Japanese residential market in the years following introduction of 
the Tokyo Green Label and that the buyer segment actively seeking to invest in their value is 
expanding. A further possibility is an increase in the supply of green buildings which may 
have led to a levelling off of the observed price premia. However, further analysis is required 
to ascertain whether the absence of the premium in the most recent is a continued trend that 
marks the end of a 'green premium era' or is simply a one-off occurrence.  
 
A number of caveats remain for this analysis. First, it is important to bear in mind that the 
Tokyo labelling system is based on applications from developers, i.e. it only indicates a 
building's hypothetical environmental performance at the time of development. It is possible 
that buyers may be reluctant to pay higher premia for energy efficiency and cost savings 
unless they are proven in operation.  
 
Similarly, unless the added economic value of green buildings offsets or exceeds the added 
development costs, developers are unlikely to develop many green buildings unless they 
receive subsidies to make up for the shortfall. Hence, we cannot rule out that the premium 
we measured may still be too low in comparison to the added development expenses which 
may be an obstacle to more widespread adaptation of green buildings in the Japanese 
market. More detailed information on the cost premium for constructing green condominium 
buildings would be required for this profitability calculation.  
 
Furthermore, it is also uncertain how the emerging green building segment will be embedded 
in the broader housing market that comprises mainly of existing stock. Under the current 
system, green labels only cover newly developed buildings, but for green building policies to 
be more effective the extension of labels to existing stock will have to be considered. Notably, 
when it comes to a buyer's choice of home, the decision is typically made under 
considerable budget restrictions. With the rapid changes in Japanese demographic structure, 
the population of people in their 30s and 40s -- which is the home-buyer segment that 
generates the greatest demand for housing -- is decreasing significantly. This may shift the 
aggregate demand curve downwards, possibly in a more pronounced manner for new 
construction and newly constructed green buildings than for the general existing housing 
stock. In this context, it will be necessary to keep monitoring whether there continues to be 
an added value and price premiums for green buildings. Finally, the economic value of green 
buildings will also be affected by more stringent environmental regulations to be 
implemented in future (Takagi and Shimizu, 2010) but it is difficult to foresee how Japanese 
17 
 
eco labels for buildings will adapt to these long-term changes in market conditions.  
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Appendix 1: Variable names and data sources for Tokyo case study 
Symbol Variable Content Unit Source 
green 
Green label 
dummy 
Green building = 1 
(0,1) Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
Other building = 0 
trans 
Transaction 
price dummy 
Transaction price=1 
(0,1) RECRUIT 
Asking price=0 
S Floor space 
Floor space of 
building/square meters 
m
2
 Real Estate Economic Institute 
TS 
Distance to 
the nearest 
station 
Distance to the nearest 
station.  
meters Real Estate Economic Institute 
Bus Bus dummy 
bus-transportation 
area=1 
(0,1) Real Estate Economic Institute 
walk-transportation 
area=2 
TT 
Time to 
CBD(Tokyo 
station) 
Average travel time 
from the nearest rail 
transit station to Tokyo 
Central Station during 
daytime hours. 
 
minutes VAL Institute 
TU Total unit 
Total units of 
condominium 
unit 
Real Estate Economic Institute 
Land Site area 
Site area of 
condominium 
m
2
 
TA 
Total building 
area 
Total building area of 
condominium 
m2 Real Estate Economic Institute 
Cost 
Management 
Cost 
Property Management 
Cost 
10000 yen/month RECRUIT 
ISP1 
With Housing 
performance 
evaluation 
report A 
dummy 
With Housing 
performance 
evaluation report A=1 
(0,1) RECRUIT 
Without Housing 
performance 
evaluation report A=2 
ISP2 With Housing With Housing (0,1) RECRUIT 
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performance 
evaluation 
report B 
dummy 
performance 
evaluation report B=1 
Without Housing 
performance 
evaluation report B=2 
MG1 
Management 
type(A) 
dummy 
Management type is 
A=1 (0,1) RECRUIT 
other =0 
MG2 
Management 
type(B) 
dummy 
Management type is 
B=1 (0,1) RECRUIT 
other =0 
Corner 
corner 
dummy 
The location of unit is 
corner =1 (0,1) Real Estate Economic Institute 
Other location =0 
STD 
Studio type 
dummy 
Floor space 30 square 
meters or less =1 
(0,1) Real Estate Economic Institute 
Floor space over 30 
square meters  = 0 
RL1 
Leasehold(A) 
dummy 
Land right is 
leasehold(Type A)=1 (0,1) RECRUIT 
other =0 
RL2 
Leasehold(B) 
dummy 
Land right is 
leasehold(Type B)=1 (0,1) RECRUIT 
other =0 
TR 
Rate of 
Sales 
Rate of sales in first 
month 
(%) Real Estate Economic Institute 
LUg  (g=0,…,G) 
Land Use 
regulation 
dummy 
g-th Land use 
regulation area=1 
(residential, office, 
industrial) 
(0,1) Real Estate Economic Institute 
other =0 
Income 
Household 
income 
Annual income of 
household 
10000 yen RECRUIT 
HDh  (h=0,…,H) 
Employment 
status 
dummy 
h-thEmployment status 
of Head of household 
=1,  (0,1) RECRUIT 
other=0 
WDi  (i=0,…,I) 
Job type 
dummy 
i-th job type  =1,  
(0,1) RECRUIT 
other=0 
YDj  (j=0,…,J) 
Business 
type dummy 
j-th business type  =1,  
(0,1) RECRUIT 
other=0 
LDk  (k=0,…,K) 
Location 
(ward) 
dummy 
k-th administrative 
district  =1,  (0,1) Real Estate Economic Institute 
Other district  =0. 
RDl  (l=0,…,L) 
Railway line 
dummy 
l-th railway line   =1 
(0,1) Real Estate Economic Institute 
Other railway line = 0. 
Dm (m=0,…,M) 
Time dummy 
(yearly) 
m-th year  =1 
(0,1) RECRUIT 
Other year =0. 
* 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Full regression results of Tokyo case study  
 (1) Baseline 
OLS 
(2) Robust reg (3) OLS with 
HH char 
(4) Income low (5) Income 
medium low 
(6) Income 
medium high 
(7) Income high 
 log price log price log price log price log price log price log price 
green 0.0482
***
 0.0428
***
 0.0475
***
 0.0368
***
 0.0389
***
 0.0511
***
 0.0589
***
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 (14.43) (13.00) (14.38) (6.00) (6.82) (7.82) (7.13) 
        
trgreen -0.00552 -0.00592 -0.00552 -0.00111 -0.000849 -0.00888 -0.0132 
 (-1.44) (-1.58) (-1.46) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-1.21) (-1.36) 
        
trans -0.0383
***
 -0.0351
***
 -0.0383
***
 -0.0435
***
 -0.0417
***
 -0.0336
***
 -0.0330
***
 
 (-19.93) (-20.20) (-20.13) (-12.88) (-12.09) (-9.66) (-7.31) 
        
sqft 0.0243
***
 0.0251
***
 0.0248
***
 0.0204
***
 0.0281
***
 0.0225
***
 0.0255
***
 
 (48.74) (88.08) (43.78) (16.18) (33.19) (31.69) (31.91) 
        
sqft_squared -0.0000642
***
 -0.0000712
***
 -0.0000686
***
 -0.0000435
***
 -0.000104
***
 -0.0000612
***
 -0.0000680
***
 
 (-16.85) (-34.66) (-15.79) (-4.81) (-16.70) (-11.59) (-11.41) 
        
ts -0.0110
***
 -0.0103
***
 -0.0106
***
 -0.00858
***
 -0.00856
***
 -0.0101
***
 -0.0141
***
 
 (-38.81) (-41.91) (-37.39) (-18.55) (-16.12) (-18.20) (-16.05) 
        
bus -0.0185
***
 -0.0198
***
 -0.0189
***
 -0.00890 -0.0277
**
 -0.0445
***
 -0.0191 
 (-3.81) (-4.05) (-3.89) (-1.24) (-3.12) (-4.45) (-1.19) 
        
busTS -0.00593
***
 -0.00722
***
 -0.00578
***
 -0.00618
***
 -0.00544
***
 -0.00601
**
 -0.00511
*
 
 (-10.15) (-14.38) (-9.94) (-7.78) (-5.77) (-2.82) (-2.33) 
        
TA -3.57e-08 1.94e-08 -3.55e-08 9.10e-08 7.39e-08 -4.30e-08 -0.000000219
***
 
 (-1.20) (0.75) (-1.20) (1.46) (1.44) (-0.82) (-3.40) 
        
ISP1 0.00644
*
 0.00503
*
 0.00642
*
 0.00453 0.00219 0.00600 0.00457 
 (2.48) (2.12) (2.50) (1.01) (0.50) (1.25) (0.66) 
        
ISP2 0.00687
***
 0.00328 0.00662
***
 0.00959
**
 0.00156 0.00197 0.0145
**
 
 (3.44) (1.81) (3.34) (2.61) (0.42) (0.53) (3.13) 
        
MG1 0.00412 0.00341 0.00169 0.000283 0.00373 0.00171 0.00872 
 (1.75) (1.58) (0.72) (0.07) (0.87) (0.39) (1.59) 
        
MG2 0.0203
***
 0.0194
***
 0.0167
***
 0.0157
**
 0.0123
*
 0.0174
**
 0.0139 
 (6.53) (7.03) (5.44) (2.69) (2.14) (3.04) (1.96) 
        
RL1 -0.00901
***
 -0.00728
***
 -0.00481
*
 -0.0111
**
 0.0000933 0.00464 -0.0118 
 (-3.98) (-3.48) (-2.11) (-2.80) (0.02) (1.17) (-1.85) 
        
RL2 -0.0412
***
 -0.0472
***
 -0.0383
***
 -0.0556
***
 -0.0173 -0.0241 -0.0436 
 (-3.68) (-4.60) (-3.52) (-3.37) (-0.85) (-1.15) (-0.86) 
        
corner 0.0199
***
 0.0186
***
 0.0187
***
 0.0255
***
 0.0190
***
 0.0200
***
 0.0132
**
 
 (9.59) (9.71) (9.09) (6.55) (5.21) (5.13) (2.77) 
        
structure 0.0171 0.0148 0.0147 0.0257
*
 0.00989 -0.00178 -0.00183 
 (1.62) (1.58) (1.45) (2.47) (0.67) (-0.13) (-0.04) 
        
TR -0.000410
***
 -0.000357
***
 -0.000403
***
 -0.000267
***
 -0.000408
***
 -0.000401
***
 -0.000332
**
 
 (-9.70) (-9.03) (-9.64) (-3.50) (-5.54) (-4.91) (-3.16) 
        
tt -0.00152
***
 -0.00183
***
 -0.00150
***
 -0.00176
***
 -0.00266
***
 -0.000645 -0.000251 
 (-8.65) (-12.55) (-8.70) (-6.01) (-9.53) (-1.79) (-0.51) 
        
FAR 0.0000476
***
 0.0000618
***
 0.0000433
***
 -0.00000242 0.0000367
*
 0.0000218 0.0000743
***
 
 (4.74) (7.72) (4.37) (-0.10) (1.97) (1.24) (3.83) 
        
comm 0.0134
***
 0.0160
***
 0.0138
***
 0.0395
***
 0.0163
*
 0.0136
*
 -0.00963 
 (3.94) (5.51) (4.09) (6.29) (2.29) (2.22) (-1.43) 
        
indust -0.0281
***
 -0.0246
***
 -0.0271
***
 -0.0133
**
 -0.0163
**
 -0.0254
***
 -0.0187
**
 
 (-10.13) (-10.41) (-9.87) (-2.65) (-3.11) (-4.76) (-2.65) 
        
rental -0.0000578
***
 -0.0000519
***
 -0.0000552
***
 -0.0000164
*
 -0.0000411
***
 -0.0000685
***
 -0.0000841
***
 
 (-13.79) (-13.34) (-13.26) (-2.07) (-5.36) (-8.45) (-8.40) 
        
old -0.0000255
***
 -0.0000323
***
 -0.0000241
***
 -0.0000383
**
 0.00000222 -0.0000350
**
 -0.00000636 
 (-3.83) (-5.25) (-3.66) (-3.22) (0.19) (-2.74) (-0.35) 
        
strc2 0.0727
***
 0.0730
***
 0.0686
***
 0.0679
***
 0.0506
***
 0.0606
***
 0.0587 
 (6.93) (7.78) (6.80) (6.53) (3.50) (4.54) (1.40) 
        
officew 0.000331
***
 0.000320
***
 0.000323
***
 0.000260
***
 0.000270
***
 0.000349
***
 0.000259
***
 
 (20.92) (22.98) (20.69) (9.15) (8.93) (11.90) (6.39) 
        
cost 0.00870
***
 0.00743
***
 0.00841
***
 0.00467
*
 0.00916
***
 0.00599
***
 0.00701
***
 
 (10.46) (10.87) (10.23) (2.51) (6.62) (4.00) (4.18) 
        
age   0.00101
***
 0.00121
***
 0.000303 0.00139
***
 0.000540 
   (7.93) (5.22) (1.37) (4.69) (1.79) 
        
number   -0.00336
**
 0.00186 0.0274
***
 0.0434
***
 0.0288
***
 
   (-2.97) (0.78) (8.41) (11.40) (7.06) 
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childdummy   -0.00188 0.000180 0.00270 0.00000949 -0.00812 
   (-0.89) (0.03) (0.72) (0.00) (-1.85) 
        
first   -0.0186
***
 -0.0150
**
 -0.0157
***
 -0.00730 -0.00377 
   (-7.38) (-3.05) (-3.45) (-1.41) (-0.71) 
        
invest   -0.0337
*
 0.0520 -0.0412 -0.122
***
 -0.0621 
   (-2.35) (1.26) (-1.52) (-4.15) (-1.94) 
        
hd4   0.0133
***
 0.0263
***
 0.0166
*
 0.00768 0.00976 
   (3.71) (5.15) (1.97) (1.19) (1.23) 
        
hd6   0.0620
***
 0.0930
***
 0.0432
***
 0.0269
*
 0.0243 
   (7.95) (5.15) (3.57) (2.14) (1.77) 
        
wd7   0.00631
*
 -0.00227 -0.00841 0.00166 0.0216
***
 
   (2.26) (-0.48) (-1.43) (0.35) (3.59) 
        
wd8   0.0190
***
 0.0153
**
 0.00885 -0.00864 0.0131
*
 
   (6.63) (2.65) (1.72) (-1.47) (2.20) 
        
wd9   0.0248
***
 0.0196 -0.00798 0.00849 0.00796 
   (4.01) (1.44) (-0.59) (0.72) (0.73) 
        
yd6   0.0178
***
 0.0110 0.00814 0.00528 0.00669 
   (6.01) (1.80) (1.24) (1.09) (1.15) 
        
_cons 7.518
***
 7.501
***
 7.482
***
 7.437
***
 7.313
***
 7.480
***
 7.515
***
 
 (177.85) (221.20) (174.97) (113.39) (107.18) (117.31) (56.14) 
N 23922 23922 23922 6038 6982 6012 4568 
R
2
 0.810 0.829 0.814 0.793 0.803 0.846 0.855 
adj. R
2
 0.809 0.828 0.813 0.788 0.799 0.842 0.850 
AIC -29921.2 . -30403.8 -8982.8 -9474.5 -8421.7 -5171.7 
BIC -28765.4 . -29159.1 -8003.8 -8460.5 -7443.3 -4246.3 
 
 
